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Sex differences are not attenuated by a sex-invariant measure of fear:  
The Situated Fear Questionnaire 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
Widely-used fear questionnaires may exaggerate sex differences because they do not ensure sex 
invariance of items and conflate anxiety with fear.  Beginning with 50 descriptions of fear-eliciting 
situations, we used Rasch analysis to identify sex-invariant items and Mokken analysis to establish 
unidimensional scalability. The resulting 27-item Situated Fear Questionnaire (SFQ) correlated highly 
with the widely-used Fear Survey Schedule, while demonstrating better discrimination between 
anxiety and fear.  Sex differences in three samples were all in excess of d = 1.00 and were not 
explained by gender role adherence or anxiety levels.  The hedonic tone associated with fear 
situations (ranging from distressing/alarming to thrilling/exhilarating) was rated as more positive by 
men and this was only partially explained by their lower reported fear. 
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1. Introduction 
 In the field of emotion research, the complex multi-systemic nature of fear has proved 
challenging for measurement (Bradley & Lang, 2000; Schaefer, Larson, Davidson, & Coan, 2014).  In 
experimental studies, fear has been assessed using fMRI indices of regional brain activation, EEG 
event-related potentials, and peripheral physiological indices that reflect activity of the autonomic 
nervous system and hypothalamic pituitary axis.  Even with such ‘objective’ measures of fear 
reactivity, laboratory researchers need self-report measures to establish baseline fear levels and to 
examine candidate mediators of differential responding.  For researchers interested in assessing fear 
outside the constraints of the laboratory, reliable and valid self-report methods are also essential.  
There has been considerable interest in understanding the evolutionary and developmental origins 
of sex differences in fear as well as their physiological and neural instantiation (Bangasser & 
Valentino, 2014; Campbell 2014; Derryberry & Rothbart, 1997).  Sex differences in fearfulness are 
central to models of emotional regulation (e.g. aggression, behavioural inhibition), cognition (e.g. 
selective attention and recall, decision making) and personality (impulsivity, sensation seeking).  The 
aim of the studies presented here was to develop and validate a sex-invariant self-reported measure 
of situational fear in a non-clinical sample. 
1.1. The need for a new fear inventory 
 Given the extensive research interest in fear, it is surprising that the three major 
psychometric measures dedicated to its assessment were developed over thirty years ago.  The Fear 
Questionnaire (FQ: Marks & Mathews, 1979) was designed to measure phobic fears in clinical 
populations.  Sixteen questions ask the respondent to rate their tendency to approach or avoid 
stimuli which range from the sight of blood to travelling on public transport.  A further six questions 
ask the participant to rate the degree to which anxiety symptoms are problematic in their daily lives.  
In a representative sample of the US population, no sex differences were found for the FQ total 
score or its subscales (Gillis, Haaga, & Ford, 1995).  The Fear Survey Schedule (FSS) has two 
commonly-used versions.  Like the FQ, the FSS-III (Wolpe & Lang, 1964) was developed for clinical 
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evaluation of phobic patients: It asks respondents to rate how much they are disturbed by ‘fear or 
other unpleasant feelings’ in response to 72 stimuli.  Among undergraduates sampled from eleven 
nations, fear was higher among women although the magnitude of the sex difference varied over 
the subscales between an average of r = .16 (d = .32) for Agoraphobia and r = .33 (d = .70) for 
Harmless Animals (Arrindell et al., 2003).  The FSS-II (Geer, 1965), developed for research purposes, 
presents 51 stimuli and respondents rate their fear on a 7-point scale from ‘None’ to ‘Terror’.  (Many 
items overlap with those in the FSS-III.)  Effect sizes for the sex difference in total scores have been 
reported as d = 0.76 (Bernstein & Allen 1969) and d = 0.70 (Geer, 1965).  There are a number of 
concerns about these scales, many of which have important implications for the accurate 
measurement of sex differences. 
1.1.1 Over-representation of phobic items 
 The first is the heavy reliance on phobic items.  Phobias are object-specific fears that are 
excessive, unreasonable, or out of proportion to the actual risk.  Phobias are more prevalent among 
women than men (Park et al., 2013: Xu et al., 2012).  Twice as many women (21.2%) as men (10.9%) 
meet the criterion for a single specific phobia and women are more likely to report multiple phobias 
(Fredrikson, Annas, Fischer & Wik, 1996).  The inclusion of a large number of phobic items may tend 
to artificially increase the magnitude of the sex difference in fear.  They may also distort it since 
phobic objects, by their nature, are unlikely to capture the full range of everyday fears.  Although 
some objects or events which evoke phobic reactions in patients also provoke a lesser degree of fear 
in the general population (e.g. the sight of blood, dentist appointments), many phobic objects do not 
provoke fear in the majority of people and may even be regarded as pleasurable (e.g. being a 
passenger in a car, being with a member of the opposite sex).  This limits the usefulness of such 
inventories for assessing fear and sex differences in fear in non-clinical populations. 
1.1.2. Fear is not anxiety  
 A second and related issue is the conflation of fear and anxiety items in many inventories 
(Sylvers, Lilienfeld & LaPrairie, 2011).  While some writers have treated the two concepts as 
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interchangeable (Izard & Ackerman, 2000; Wolpe, 1987) or as complementary facets of the same 
concept (Beck & Emery, 2005), many more have argued for their independence (McNaughton, & 
Corr, 2004; Öhman, 2008; Perkins, Kemp, & Corr, 2007; Sylvers et al., 2011).  Fear is a short-lived, 
acute state that motivates avoidance and escape, after which the emotion quickly dissipates (Epstein 
1972; Gray & McNaughton, 2000).  The source of danger is specific, present and immediate (Adolphs 
2013; Lang, Davis, & Ohman, 2000).  Anxiety is a response to a stimulus which is ambiguous or 
uncertain in terms of threat. In contrast to fear, the temporal orientation is to the future rather than 
the present.  Anxiety is a response to a possible threat that must be faced (Gray & McNaughton, 
2000), where avoidance is impossible (Tellegen, 1982).  It is associated with a protracted state of 
generalised hyper-vigilance and arousal that can persist even when the individual is removed from 
the triggering situation.  The conflation of anxiety with fear is reflected in item wording.  The FSS 
contains items assessing anxiety, while the Manifest Anxiety Scale contains items that ask explicitly 
about fear.  The average correlation between anxiety measures and phobic fear measures (such as 
the FSS) is r = .46 (Sylvers et al., 2011).  This has implications for the measurement of sex differences. 
Cross-culturally women score higher than men on Big Five neuroticism, especially the anxiety facet 
(Costa, Terracciano, & McCrae, 2001). They are twice as likely to suffer from anxiety disorders 
(Altemus, Sarvaiya, & Epperson, 2014; Bangasser & Valentino, 2014). To the extent that fear 
inventories simultaneously tap anxiety, women’s scores may be artificially inflated relative to men’s.  
Noting that correlations between anxiety and fear became smaller as the content overlap between 
the measures decreased, Sylvers et al. (2011, p. 133) identified a need for “refinement of self-report 
measures of fear and anxiety to reduce cross-contamination of constructs and construct irrelevant 
variance”.  We aim to develop a measure that addresses fear as an immediate emotional reaction 
rather than brooding anticipation.  
1.1.3. Differential item responding by sex? 
 Another issue relevant to accurately estimating sex differences is the need to ensure that 
items perform invariantly over sex.  In other words, an item should be as likely to be endorsed by a 
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high-scoring (or low-scoring) man as by a high-scoring (or low-scoring) woman.  Without this 
equivalence, cross-sex comparisons of total scores can be misleading, analogous to comparing 
apples and oranges.  No test of differential item functioning has been conducted on extant fear 
measures. The development of a sex-invariant fear questionnaire was a key aim of this study. This 
was established using Rasch analysis to measure differential item functioning which assesses 
whether an item is more ‘difficult’ for one sex than the other. Classical test theory which has been 
used to analyse inventories such as the FSS (e.g. Arrindell, 1980) is based on covariance between 
items.  Factor analysis assumes that scores can be summed to the extent that they load on a 
common factor. This means that two individuals (or two sexes) could receive the same trait score 
even though they have endorsed non-overlapping sets of items. For example, in a test of arithmetic 
ability, a person who correctly answered 2 + 2 would receive the same score as someone who 
correctly answered 234 – 153 / 9.  By contrast, Rasch analysis examines the structure of the items 
based on ordering them in terms of difficulty.  It is predicated on the premise that an individual who 
achieves a high overall score would be more likely to get the second question correct than someone 
who gets a lower overall score. This can be applied to personality traits also to reveal the 
dimensionality of the items.  A ‘difficult’ item corresponds to one which is endorsed only by those 
with a high level of the latent trait.  In the present study, we used Rasch analysis to compare the 
‘difficulty’ structure of items for the two sexes.  Differential item functioning was used to reduce the 
initial item number, retaining only those which were sex invariant.  This was followed by Mokken 
analysis on a new sample to confirm the hierarchical scalability of the items.  
1.1.4. Gender, fear and self-presentation 
 An additional concern about sex differences in fear is whether they are artefacts of 
gendered self-presentation, resulting from men’s reluctance to admit fear on self-report instruments 
(Jansz, 2000). Fear scores are negatively associated with masculinity (Arrindell, 2000) and positively 
with femininity (Tucker & Bond, 1997). Nevertheless, studies which control for gender role 
adherence still find a significant effect of biological sex (Arindell, Kolk, Pickersgill & Hageman, 1993; 
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Dillon, Wolf & Katz, 1985) and informing participants that the honesty of their responses are 
verifiable by physiological measures does not eliminate the sex difference (McLean & Hope, 2010; 
Pierce & Kirkpatrick, 1992). We examined this issue further in the present study. 
1.1.5. Dimensionality 
 We also addressed three further concerns about existing fear measures.  The first was 
questionnaire dimensionality.  Both the FQ and FSS are multi-dimensional.  The four factors of the 
FQ (Agoraphobic; Blood-Injury; Social; Anxiety-Depression) and the five factors of the FSS-III (Social; 
Agoraphobic; Bodily Injury, Death and Illness; Sex and Aggression; Harmless Animals) show evidence 
of stability across sex and culture (Arrindell, Emmelkamp, & van der Ende, 1985; Arrindell et al., 
2003).  However, the orthogonal nature of the factors (as well as the specificity of phobic disorders) 
means that subscale scores should not be summed to create total scores (Arrindell et al., 1984). This 
is problematic for researchers who want a global fear measure for research proposes.  We therefore 
sought to create a unidimensional scale.    
1.1.6. Number and range of items 
 A further concern was ensuring a sufficient number and range of items.  Large-scale fear 
surveys use single items measuring the frequency or intensity of experiencing fear (Brebner, 2003; 
Fischer, Mosquera, van Vianen, & Manstead, 2004; Simon & Nath, 2004).  Fear has also been 
assessed as one component of more general psychometric mood inventories.  On the Positive and 
Negative Affectivity Scale (PANAS: Watson, Clark & Tellegen, 1988), two of the 10 negative mood 
items (‘scared’, ’afraid’) assess fear and respondents are asked to rate ‘to what extent’ (the wording 
does not clearly distinguish between frequency and intensity) they have experienced these emotions 
in a given time frame.  Similarly, three of the 12 emotions on the Differential Emotions Scale (Izard, 
Libero, Putnam, & Haynes, 1993) tap the frequency of experiencing fear (e.g. ‘Feel scared, uneasy, 
like something might harm you’) over a specified time period.  The use of a single item (or a small 
number of items) limits reliability and prevents examination of the range of situations which elicit 
fear.  To ensure coverage of a full range of fear-inducing situations and to compare their relative 
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‘difficulty’ for men and women, it was important to include items ranging from mildly to extremely 
frightening.  This means that some of the situations described may not have been experienced by 
respondents.  There has been debate about the accuracy with which respondents are able to rate 
their reaction to hypothetical situations (Jackson & Mauran, 1996; Zuckerman, 1996). Although we 
recognise these concerns, we believe that they are less applicable in the case of fear measurement.  
Fear is an emotion adaptively designed to keep the organism safe by causing avoidance or 
withdrawal.  The capacity to anticipate fear is what allows us to make informed choices about future 
behaviour (Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee  & Welch 2001). A person who refuses an invitation to take 
part in a parachute jump does so based on the degree of fear they would experience were they to 
jump. Without this ability, a person would have to experience potentially lethal risks before they 
could establish whether or not they were frightening.  We therefore believe that respondents are in 
a good position to provide reasonable estimates of their fear in situations they may not have directly 
experienced.         
1.1.7. Need for context 
 A final concern is with item wording. In the FSS, many items are presented as single words 
(death, heights) or short phrases without elaboration (meeting someone for the first time), so that 
the questions lack detail and context.  For example, for many people the degree of fear associated 
with snake may crucially depend on situational factors (e.g. proximity to target, availability of escape 
routes, whether the snake is uncaged, etc.).  Fear associated with airplane travel may depend on 
whether or not there is turbulence.  Thus fear-ratings may vary widely on account of the lack of 
specificity of the items (Lick, Sushinsky, & Malow, 1977). 
1.2 Aims of the present study 
 To overcome these issues (over-representation of phobic items, conflation of anxiety and 
fear, differential item functioning,  gendered self-presentation, questionnaire dimensionality, item 
number and wording),  we developed a measure of fear intensity as a situated and short-lived 
emotional response to risky or potentially dangerous situations that might be encountered in the 
8 
 
real world.  The items were designed to represent a unidimensional scale with a hierarchical 
structure that was invariant over sex: This was assessed by comparing Rasch scores calculated for 
each item between males and females.  The sex-invariant items retained following Rasch analysis 
were subsequently submitted to a nonparametric item response method, another Rasch analysis 
and also confirmatory factor analysis.   We then examined the convergent validity of the scale in 
relation to a range of related measures and the effect of sex on fear scores after controlling for 
variation in gender role adherence. 
 In addition, we considered whether sex differences in fear might explain the sex difference 
in enjoyment of risky activities.  It is paradoxical that while fear can motivate avoidance, it can also 
be pleasurable.  The popularity of theme parks and scary movies attest to this.  Men’s greater 
average taste for risk is visible in their greater involvement in extreme sports (Robinson, 2008), and 
their faster and more reckless driving (Beattie, 2008).  Men score significantly higher than women on 
Zuckermans’ Sensation Seeking Scale,   a finding attributable to the degree of risk involved since sex 
differences are not found on the subscale of Experience Seeking which measures preferences for 
new experiences that are not marked by risk e.g. eating exotic food (Zuckerman, 1994).  
Furthermore, sex differences in reported risk-taking are completely mediated by differences in 
sensation seeking scores (Zuckerman & Kuhlman, 2000).  Men make riskier decisions than women 
(Croson & Gneezy, 2009) and the magnitude of the sex difference increases as the risks involved 
become more life-threatening, leading Byrnes, Miller and Schaffer (1999, p. 378) to conclude “fear 
responses may explain gender differences in risk taking more adequately than the cognitive 
processes involved in the reflective evaluation of options”.  Women are more sensitive to the 
dangers associated with risky actions (Harris & Miller, 2000; Harris, Jenkins & Glaser, 2006).  
Experimentally framing a risky choice in such a way as to draw attention to potential negative 
consequences reduces risk taking in women but not men (Gabriel & Williamson, 2010).  In the 
present study, in addition to completing fear ratings, we asked respondents to rate the hedonic 
valence, ranging from negative (distress) to positive (exhilaration), associated with the 
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questionnaire’s various fear-provoking situations.  Given findings of elevated female fear and danger 
sensitivity, we hypothesised that a sex difference found in the hedonic valence of these risky 
situations would be mediated by women’s higher level of fear. 
2. Method 
2.1 Situated Fear Questionnaire: Initial item selection 
 Fifty items were created based on personal experience, peer discussion and past inventories 
(see Table 1).  The items represented fear across a broad range of situations including: fear of 
physical trauma, illness or death; situations of heightened personal vulnerability; fear of public 
humiliation; fear of harm to loved ones.  Items also varied in terms of whether the situations had 
been freely entered into (e.g. roller coaster rides, scuba diving) or had occurred unexpectedly (e.g. 
aircraft turbulence, skidding on ice while driving).  For each item participants rated their fear on a 5-
point Likert scale (Not at all afraid; A little afraid; Moderately afraid; Very afraid; Extremely afraid). 
2.2 Participants and materials 
 To determine the required sample sizes, we conducted a priori power analyses.  For Rasch 
analysis, a sample of 245 participants gives 99% confidence that no item calibration is more than 0.5 
logit away from its stable value (Linacre, 1995). For the other analyses, a sample of N=245 provides 
99% power to detect a correlation of .30 and an effect size of d = .50. Therefore N=248 was the 
minimum sample size (Sample 3) with the other two samples being larger (Sample 1 N=301; Sample 
2 N=320).   The study was approved by the Ethics Subcommittee of the Durham University 
Psychology Department and informed consent was given by all participants.  
2.2.1 Sample 1 
 Participants. An opportunity sample of 301 British participants (209 women and 92 men) 
completed the questionnaires online.  Ninety seven per cent (N=292) participants were in the 18-25 
age group.  The participants were recruited for the study via a university participant pool and social 
networking sites.   
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 Measures. Participants completed the 50-item Situated Fear Questionnaire (SFQ).  In 
addition, they rated the hedonic tone (subjective experience) of the same 50 situations.  This was 
measured on a 5-point Likert scale (Extremely distressing/alarming; Quite distressing/alarming, 
Neutral, Quite exhilarating/thrilling; Extremely thrilling/exhilarating.  This scale was scored from 1 
(Extremely alarming) to 5 (Extremely thrilling/ exhilarating).   
2.2.2 Sample 2 
 Participants. Three hundred and twenty Romanian participants took part (236 women and 
83 men).  Of those reporting their age, ninety three per cent (N=287) were in the 18-25 age group 
(68 men, 219 women).  All participants were volunteer first and second year students at Babes-
Bolyai University (Cluj, Romania) who completed the questionnaires in class time. 
 Measures. Participants completed the 50-item SFQ as described above. In addition, they 
completed the Zuckerman Kuhlman Personality Inventory (ZKPQ: Zuckerman d & Kuhlman, n.d.); 
Approach Avoidance Temperament Questionnaire (ATQ: Elliott & Thrash, 2010); and the Harm 
Avoidance scale from the Multidimensional Personality Questionnaire (MPQ: Tellegen, 1982).  The 
ZKPQ had been already been translated into Romanian for a previous study (Opre & Albu, 2010).  
The remaining questionnaires were translated into Romanian by two of the authors (RD and AO) and 
then independently back translated by an academic in the Faculty of Letters (Languages and 
Literature) at Babes-Bolyai University. 
2.2.3 Sample 3 
 Participants. Two hundred and forty eight British participants took part (116 men and 132 
women).  All but one participant were in the 18-25 age group.  Participants were invited to take part 
by undergraduate psychology students as part of a practical assignment.  They completed the 
questionnaires online. 
 Measures. Participants completed a shortened 36-item version of the SFQ (see Table 1).  As 
in Sample 1, they also rated the hedonic tone of these situations (Extremely distressing/alarming to 
Extremely thrilling/exhilarating).  They completed the Fear Survey Schedule (FSS: Wolpe & Lang, 
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1964); Stress Reaction and Harm Avoidance scales of the MPQ (Tellegen, 1982); and the 
Instrumental (masculine) and Expressive (feminine) scales of the Personal Attributes Questionnaire 
(Spence & Helmreich, 1978). 
3. Results 
3.1 Situated Fear Questionnaire: Psychometric analysis 
             The psychometric analyses included item response theory methods and factor analysis.  We 
used both Rasch and Mokken analysis to investigate unidimensionality and the hierarchical ordering 
of items.  We first used Rasch analysis to investigate differential item functioning over sex as the 
procedures are more well-established for this purpose.  We then used Mokken analysis to check the 
scale on a new sample of participants as another method of investigating unidimensionality.  The 
items that were considered to form a scale were then examined from a Rasch perspective.  Lastly we 
tested the factor structure with ordinal confirmatory factor analysis.   
3.1.1 Unidimensionality and invariance (Rasch analysis).   
 We began by using Rasch analysis to reduce item redundancy and create a set of items that 
were invariant over sex.  Rasch analysis takes a set of item responses and uses their likelihood of 
endorsement (‘item difficulty’) as a means of testing whether they fit a latent unidimensional scale. 
Respondents are then assigned a score on this scale.  The analysis was performed on RUMM2030 
 Using data from Sample 1, we first checked the person fit statistics for the 50 item scale.  
The person fit statistics indicate how well each individual’s responses follow the Rasch model, by 
identifying any participants who are following idiosyncratic response sets rather than responding 
differentially to the items.  Although six participants had relatively poor infit mean square statistics 
of >2, only one of these had clearly responded inappropriately and answered with an alternating 
pattern of 1 and 5.  This participant was not considered in the remaining analysis. The item statistics 
were encouraging (see Table 1).  The fit measures indicate the ratio of observed variance to that 
expected by the Rasch unidimensional model.  The infit statistic is an adjustment to the outfit value 
which reduces the effect of outliers.  A mean square fit statistic of 1 indicates ideal fit and values of 
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over 1.5 indicate poor fit.   All of the items had fit statistics in the acceptable range.  All of the items 
also had positive point-measure correlations (between the item and Rasch total score) with a 
median correlation of .49.   
 Next we considered the issue of differential item functioning by sex.  This is examined by 
calculating Rasch measure scores for each item separately for males and females, and then 
comparing the scores.  Rasch analysis takes account of the ‘ability’ of the participants (in this case 
their fearfulness) when computing item difficulty so any sex differences between scores on the items 
are not related to differences in fear.  Rather, a significant difference between the scores indicates 
that the item is not being treated in the same way by the two sexes.  This would mean that the 
instrument as a whole was not functioning the same way for male and female participants.  The 
statistical significance was determined by using Tristan’s (2006) DIF analysis with an adjustment for 
sample size (see Table 1).  (We did not correct for multiple tests because our aim was to be 
conservative in ensuring that only gender-neutral items were retained.) There were fourteen items 
that showed significant differences (4, 6, 10, 15, 19, 20, 21, 25, 38, 41, 43, 45, 48, 49). These were 
split fairly evenly in terms of which sex showed the bias.  We removed these items from the 
remainder of the analyses.   
 We then checked the unidimensionality of the 36 item fear measure by conducting a PCA of 
the residuals left after the Rasch component had been removed (Mavranezouli, Brazier, Young, & 
Barkham, 2011).  Monte Carlo studies have shown that an eigenvalue of over 2 should be 
investigated as a source of a potential factor (Linacre, 2012).  The Rasch unidimensional component 
had an eigenvalue of 35.7 and accounted for 49.8 per cent of the variance.  The second potential 
component had an eigenvalue of 2.5 and accounted for 3.5 per cent of the variance.  The factor 
sensitivity ratio (Wright & Stone, 2004) which compares the residual variance to that explained by 
Rasch dimension was .07. This was acceptably low and suggested that the second potential 
component did not affect measurement accuracy. The impact of this factor on person scores (Smith, 
2002) was also negligible.  The item reliability of the 36-item questionnaire (the extent to which the 
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hierarchical ordering of items would be replicated in new samples) was high at .99.  It also had 
excellent person reliability of .90 (person reliability indicates whether the ordering of persons would 
be replicated if the sample was given a parallel set of items).  Values of above .7 are considered 
acceptable and those above .8 are considered good (Bond & Fox, 2007).  The Cronbach’s alpha of the 
36-item scale was α = .91. 
3.1.2 Scalability and factor structure (Mokken and CFA analysis).   
 We then examined the hierarchical scalability of the 36 item measure on a new sample 
(Sample 3).  To do this, we used Mokken analysis, a non-parametric form of item response theory 
(Mokken, 1971; Molenaar, 1982).    Although based on Guttman scaling, Mokken does not assume 
error-free data.  Nor does it include assumptions about the sigmoid shape of item characteristic 
curves that can result in the rejection of many items and so decrease the reliability of the resultant 
measure.  Invariant item ordering (IIO) means that items can be ranked according to their ‘difficulty’ 
(or frequency of endorsement), allowing for hierarchical ordering of scale items.  This requires the 
calculation of three coefficients. Coefficient H for each item provides a measure of the item’s 
scalability (and unidimensionality).  From these values, an H coefficient for the full scale can be 
calculated which indexes the extent to which scale items accurately order respondents. HT reverses 
the role of persons and items, and thus indexes the extent to which a sample of individuals agree on 
the ordering of the items (Sijtsma, Meijer & van der Ark, 2011).  Taken together, H and HT are 
indicative of the strength and structure of a scale.  Values greater than .3 indicate a hierarchical scale 
(van Schur, 2003). 
 Data were analysed using ‘mokken’, a programme in the package of freely-available 
statistical software ‘R’ (van der Ark 2007).  This programme has an automated item selection 
procedure which places items onto scales directly, making it easy to see if the items fall onto one or 
more scales.  We entered all 36 items and specified a solution that corresponded to a minimum 
acceptable scale H = 0.3.  Two items (34, 44) were rejected as not fitting the first extracted scale.  
Although this scale had good internal consistency (rho = .93) and HT = .50, the scalability was only 
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marginally acceptable at H = .31.  Examination of the item H values indicated that seven items were 
unacceptably low at H < .28 (2, 5, 8, 9, 16, 30, 33).  These 9 items were removed and the analysis was 
run again on the remaining 27 items.  A single scale was identified with stronger scalability indices 
for person ordering (H = .36) and item ordering (HT = .53). All items had H values > .31.  Backward 
selection for item removal (based on the Crit criterion for monotonicity) indicated no items that 
required removal.  Internal consistency remained high (rho = .93) for the final 27 item scale.  Rasch 
analysis was then conducted on the 27 item scale.  The fit statistics were all in the acceptable range 
with the worst item having an outfit statistic of 1.2, and the median point-measure correlation was 
0.57.  The item reliability of .99 and person reliability of .95 were also good.  The PCA of residuals 
revealed that the Rasch component had an eigenvalue of 38.1and explained 58.6% of the variance.  
The sensitivity ratio was also acceptable at 0.06.  Overall these measures are better than those from 
the 36 item scale, even though those were acceptable from a Rasch standpoint. The correlation 
between male and female mean scores across the 27 items was r = .97, p<.001 (Sample 1), r = .94, 
p<.001 (Sample 2) and r = .99, p<.001 (Sample 3).  
 Finally, to confirm the single factor structure of the 27 items with classical test theory, we 
used confirmatory factor analysis.  This was run the R ‘lavaan’ program for ordinal data which uses 
diagonally weighted least squares to estimate model parameters.  The fit statistics indicated a 
unitary construct was a good fit to the data, CFI = .98, RMSEA = .06 (90% CI [.05, .07]), although the 
chi square value remained significant, X2(324) = 610.49, p<. 001.  
3.2 Convergent and construct validity 
 Mean scores were computed for each participant on the 27 SFQ items. We first examined 
the correlation between the SFQ and the most widely used measure of fear, the Wolpe and Lang’s 
(1964) Fear Survey Schedule (See Table 2). This correlation was strong and significant, r = .69, p<.001 
(Sample 3).  
 In line with our interest in the relationship between fear and anxiety, we computed 
correlations between the SFQ and MPQ Stress Reaction Scale, r = .29, p<.001 (Sample 3) and the 
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ZKPQ Neuroticism-Anxiety scale, r = .31, p<.001 (Sample 2).  These moderate correlations suggest 
that, although SFQ fear is conceptually distinct from anxiety, more anxious people report higher 
levels of situated fear.  However the correlation of the MPQ Stress Reaction scale with FSS, r = .41, 
p<.001, was significantly higher than with SFQ, t(245) = 2.61, p<.01.  This suggests that the FSS with 
its large complement of phobic items is more strongly associated with anxiety than the SFQ.  
 Fear is an emotion associated with avoidant motivation.  The MPQ Harm Avoidance scale 
explicitly assesses avoidance of danger and excitement, and this scale as expected showed a positive 
correlation with SFQ (Sample 3: r = .39, p<.001; Sample 2: r = .32, p<.001) and with the FSS measure, 
r = .37, p<.001.  We also examined correlations with measures of more general avoidance and 
approach temperament (ATQ; Eliott & Thrash, 2010) in Sample 2’s data.  Avoidance temperament is 
defined as a general neurobiological sensitivity to negative stimuli. The SFQ was positively correlated 
with avoidance, r = .33, p<.001 although it was unrelated to approach temperament, r = .09, p=.10.    
3.3 Sex differences 
 Sex differences across the three samples are presented in Table 3.  Effect sizes were in 
excess of d = 1.00 indicating a large effect which was consistent across all three samples.  In a 2 (sex) 
by 3 (sample) analysis of variance, the main effect of sex was significant F(1,847) = 251.78, p<.001, d 
= 1.09.  Although the Romanian sample scored significantly lower than both British samples, F(2,847) 
= 14.69, p<.001, there was no significant interaction between sample and respondent sex.  In Sample 
3, respondents completed both the SFQ and the Fear Survey Schedule.  The effect size for the sex 
difference on the FSS was of medium size, t(246) = 4.12, p<.001, d = .53, while it was considerably 
larger for the SFQ, t(243) = 8.16, p<.001, d = 1.04. 
     The sex difference was only slightly reduced when measures of anxiety were controlled. In 
Sample 2, when ZKPQ Neuroticism-Anxiety was entered as a covariate, the effect size dropped from 
d = -1.23 to d = -1.12, F(1,303) =  82.68, p<.001.  In Sample 3, the introduction of MPQ Stress 
Reaction reduced the effect size from d = -1.04 to d = -1.00, F(1,242) = 59.12, p<.001. 
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 It has been suggested that sex differences in self-reported fear result from (or are 
exaggerated by) a reluctance to acknowledge fear associated with the male gender role.  In Sample 
3, participants also completed the PAQ which provides measures of instrumentality (associated with 
a masculine gender role) and expressivity (associated with a feminine gender role).  There was a 
significant sex difference with women scoring higher in expressivity (femininity), t(246) =2.06, p=.04, 
although men’s score on instrumentality (masculinity) was not significantly higher than women’s, 
t(246)= -1.75, p=.08.  Both scales were significantly but modestly correlated with SFQ scores in the 
expected direction.  To examine whether the association between biological sex and fear was 
mediated by gender roles, we used 10,000 bootstrapped samples to estimate confidence intervals.   
The total effect for the model, B = .56 [CI -.69, -.42] and the direct effect, B = -.52 [CI-.65, -.38] were 
both significant.  The indirect effect of sex on fear through masculinity and femininity was not 
significant, B = -.04 [CI -.09, -.01].  Biological sex remained a highly significant predictor of fear when 
gender role was controlled. 
3.4 Fear and enjoyment of danger 
 The SSImp scale (ZKPQ) is composed of two factors (Zuckerman & Kuhlman, n.d.).  It has 
been argued that an aggregate score conflates two distinct constructs.  Sensation seeking is 
associated with willingness to engage in risky and dangerous activities such as parachute jumping. 
However such activities typically involve a considered decision and careful preparation.  By contrast, 
impulsivity assesses a tendency to act without thought or planning.  A meta-analysis by Cross, 
Copping and Campbell (2011) found a sex difference on the former but not the latter. This was also 
true in the present data (Sample 2: Sensation seeking t(313) = -2.92, p=.004, d = 0.45; Impulsivity 
t(312)=-1.08, p=.28, d = 0.15). As expected, there was no correlation between SFQ and Impulsivity, r 
= -.09, p=.11, but there was a significant although modest correlation with Sensation Seeking, r = -
.15, p=.008 (see Table 2). 
  The ZKPQ Sensation Seeking subscale includes statements that represent a carefree 
approach to life (e.g. “I’ll try anything once”; “I Prefer friends who are excitingly unpredictable”) but 
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only a few items refer explicitly to frightening or risky behaviours.  In order to examine associations 
between fear and enjoyment of risk while holding situation constant, we computed the correlation 
between participants’  ratings of fear and their ratings of hedonic tone (from ‘alarming’ to 
‘exhilarating’) across the 27 situations (Samples 1 & 3 excluding multivariate outliers; N= 668).  The 
correlation was highly significant, r = -.51, p<.001. The correlation was of similar magnitude for 
males, r = -.43, p<.001 and females, r = -.42, p<.001.  There was a significant sex difference, t(668)=  
9.27, p<.001, d = 0.74 with women rating the hedonic tone associated with fear more negatively 
than men, Meanwomen=2.27, SD=.40; Meanmen =  2.58, SD=.44). In Sample 3, for whom PAQ scores 
were available, we examined the association between gender role and reported hedonic tone.  
These correlations were not significant for either Masculinity, r = .09, p=.13 or Femininity, r = .12, 
p=.07.    
 We used mediation analysis to investigate whether the sex difference in hedonic tone was 
explained by the sex difference in fear.  We used 10,000 bootstrapped samples to estimate 
confidence intervals.  The total effect for the model was B = .30 [CI .24, .36]. The indirect effect of 
fear was significant, B = .18 [CI .14, .23] although the direct effect of sex also remained significant B = 
.12 [CI.05, .18]. Thus approximately 60 per cent of the variance in the sex difference in enjoyment of 
risky situations was explained by men’s lower levels of fear in these same situations.   
4. Discussion 
We used three samples to refine the Situated Fear Questionnaire and to examine its 
convergent validity.  Our first sample completed the initial 50-item version of the questionnaire.  
Rasch scores were computed for men and women and the item-level results compared.  Because 
Rasch analysis takes account of the ‘ability’ of the participants (in this case their fearfulness) when 
computing item difficulty, a discrepancy indicates that the item is not of equivalent difficulty (ease of 
endorsement) for men and women.  This analysis led to the exclusion of fourteen items.  
 On a number of these excluded items, men scored higher than would be expected given 
their overall lower fear level.  These included coping practically and emotionally with another 
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person’s health emergency (items 20, 25) and failing to live up to obligations to a workmate, 
employer or friend (items 10, 21, 45).  Unexpectedly, given men’s riskier driving, they also scored 
higher than expected on fear when being ‘cut up’ by another motorway driver (item 6).  Similarly, 
despite their greater involvement in risky recreational activities, their scores for a roller coaster ride 
(item 4), a cliff top walk (item 38), and when swimming during a shark warning (item 49) were 
unexpectedly high.   It may be that the conscious experience of fear is not equally distressing to the 
two sexes and this is supported by the significant sex difference in hedonic tone with men 
experiencing fear situations as less alarming and distressing than women.  For men, the fear 
inherent in these recreational activities may have associated elements of thrill or exhilaration.  
Relative to their overall greater level of fear, women scored higher than expected on items reflecting 
personal vulnerability including being isolated and alone (items 15, 19, 41) and receiving threatening 
anonymous calls (item 43).  
With the above items excluded and the questionnaire reduced to 36 items, the Rasch 
component accounted for fifty per cent of the variance and the questionnaire had excellent item 
and person reliability.  On a new sample, we then used Mokken analysis to investigate the scalability 
of the items. A further nine items were removed resulting in a 27-item scale. Confirmatory factor 
analysis indicated a single factor model.  Internal consistency was excellent and the correlation 
between male and female mean scores across the 27 items was near unity.    The most fear-inducing 
situations were traumatic injury (loss of sensation in the legs following a car accident; risk of 
blindness following retinal detachment).   These were followed by inability to escape a fire, loss of 
contact with a family member following a local terrorist attack, and losing control of a car on an icy 
road.  The least fear-provoking situations were an electrical power outage when alone in a house, 
being caught outside in a thunder storm, being called aside by customs officials, being stranded 
abroad without money and finding oneself drunk and alone at a party.   
Sex differences on the SFQ fear measure were strong with effect sizes exceeding d = 1.00 in 
each of the three samples.  The magnitude of this sex difference exceeds those found in a number of 
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domains where sex differences are well established, including aggression (Archer, 2004), sensation 
seeking (Cross, Copping & Campbell, 2011) and sexual behaviour (Petersen & Hyde, 2010).  
Furthermore, the present sex difference was found on a questionnaire which was explicitly designed 
to be sex invariant in content.  In recent years, there have been only a few attempts to apply item 
response theory to the measurement of domains where sex differences are of interest.  Invariance 
as a function of sex was examined (and confirmed) in a recent analysis of the Empathy Quotient 
scale (Allison, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Stone, & Muncer, 2011).  Sexual symmetry in admissions 
of intimate partner violence has been a contentious issue and consequently one in which item 
invariance over sex is of key importance.  Although Jose, Olino and O’Leary (2012) reported 
measures of item difficulty for men and women on the Conflict Tactics Scale, these were not 
explicitly used to modify the measurement instrument.  In developing psychometric measures, items 
showing differential functioning should be revised or discarded and this is especially critical in 
domains where sex differences are controversial or disputed.  Differential item functioning means 
that there is a significant difference between the proportion of men and women at the same fear 
level who positively endorse the item.  This can make comparison between men and women in 
overall scores misleading.   
The substantial sex difference in fear was not attributable to personality traits associated 
with male and female gender roles.  It has been suggested that instrumental traits associated with 
masculinity (such as ‘stands up well under pressure’) are antithetical to the public acknowledgement 
of traits like fear that can indicate vulnerability or weakness.   Reciprocally, expressive traits 
associated with femininity may enhance readiness to recognise emotions such as fear.  Between 
1970 and 1995, women’s scores on the PAQ masculinity scale rose significantly, although men’s 
femininity scores did not alter (Twenge 1997; 2009).  In line with this, we found a significant sex 
difference for femininity only.  Mediation analysis indicated that gender role adherence did not 
explain the sex difference in fear.  This supports an expanding body of neuroimaging and 
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electrophysiological research suggesting a biological basis for the greater reactivity of women than 
men when exposed to the same fear-inducing stimulus.      
The effect size for the sex difference in fear was only slightly reduced when anxiety was 
statistically controlled.  There is increasing recognition that fear and anxiety are distinct (although 
related) concepts and there have been calls for more sensitive measures that are capable of 
distinguishing between them.  This is especially relevant for the estimation of sex differences.  
Sylvers et al. (2011) in their meta-analysis calculated the weighted mean correlation between phobic 
fear measures and self-reported anxiety at r = .46 and, in the present data, the FSS correlated with 
the MPQ Stress Reaction scale at r = .41.  However the SFQ showed a lower correlation with both 
Stress Reaction and Neuroticism-Anxiety suggesting that the SFQ is less contaminated by variance 
associated with anxiety.  Attempts to distinguish between fear and anxiety have been made at 
conceptual and definitional levels (Ohman, 2008; Tellegen, 1982), as well as in terms of evolutionary 
function (Boyer & Bergstrom, 2011), proposed psychological systems (Gray & McNaughton, 2000), 
differential pharmacological sensitivity (McNaughton & Corr, 2004) and neuroanatomy (Davis, 
Walker, Miles, & Grillon, 2010).  Nonetheless, if two biologically distinct systems exist, it would be 
surprising if there was not a positive association between them.  The strength with which an 
individual experiences anxiety (a heightened anticipation of potentially challenging situations and 
concern about coping with them) is likely to have implications for fear (an intense phasic avoidant 
response to a short-lived threat)---as well as vice versa. Moderate correlations may reflect a genuine 
association rather than a measurement issue of item overlap (Perkins et al., 2007).  
 As expected, a lower threshold for experiencing fear was associated with a more avoidant 
temperament.  Elliott and Thrash (2010) aligned their two measures of temperament with Gray’s 
original Behavioural Activation System (BAS) and Behavioural Inhibition System (BIS).  However, in 
an important revision of the theory, Gray and McNaughton (2000) made a key alteration to the 
proposed function of the BIS system:  Rather than sensitivity to conditioned punishing stimuli, the 
new role of BIS was to resolve approach-avoidance and avoidance-avoidance conflicts.  BIS was seen 
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as central to anxiety in terms of orchestrating behaviour where the organism cannot avoid 
engagement with the situation.  By contrast, behavioural responses to imminent danger were 
proposed to be managed by the Fight/Flight/Freeze system (FFFS). This new formulation underlined 
the distinction between anxiety (associated with approach decisions) and fear (associated with 
avoidance reactions).   
 There have been efforts to develop psychometric measures of the reconceptualised tri-
partite fear system (FFFS) using classical test theory.  Jackson (2009) and Corr and Cooper (in 
preparation) developed items assessing respondents’ rated likelihood of engaging in the three 
different behaviours in response to fear.  It would be of interest to examine these behaviourally-
oriented scales in relation to the SFQ scale which focuses on the intensity of affective reactions, and 
to examine associations between different SFQ fear situations and behavioural response tendencies.  
However there are psychometric issues with the Fight scales.  Although Jackson’s (2009) Flight and 
Freeze scales showed a significant inter-correlation (and significantly higher scores in women), the 
Fight scale was uncorrelated with either (and showed a significantly higher score in men).  Similarly, 
Corr and Cooper’s (in preparation) FFFS scale included items referring only to Flight and Freeze; Fight 
items were captured by a separate scale called ‘defensive fight’.  More recently, a lexical approach 
was taken by Maack, Buchanan and Young (2015) who identified synonyms for the emotional states 
corresponding to the three behavioural responses e.g. ‘disengaged’ (Freeze), ‘argumentative’ (Fight), 
‘terrified’ (Flight).  This study also reported difficulties identifying a clean Fight scale. Nevertheless, it 
would be of interest to examine associations between this scale (which assesses experiential states 
associated with the various response styles) and the current measure of situated fear intensity.  
 Finally we examined whether fear is experienced as more distressing by women than by men 
and whether this may explain women’s greater avoidance of risky and dangerous activities.  
Affective responses (‘feelings’) play an important role in appraising the rewards and costs of risky 
activities (Loewenstein et al., 2001), with fear intensity acting as an emotional cue for stronger 
avoidance.  Our data indicate a marked sex difference in fear and this is congruent with studies that 
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have attributed women’s desistance from risky activities to their greater emotional sensitivity to 
negative outcomes (e.g. Harris et al., 2006). However it is also possible that the same intensity of 
fear is experienced differently by women and men.  It is paradoxical that while fear can motivate 
avoidance, it can also be pleasurable, even appetitive.  Extreme sports enthusiasts report fear but 
also find the experience thrilling.  Women rated the various fear situations in the SFQ as more 
distressing and alarming than men.  Mediation analysis indicated that this sex difference was chiefly 
attributable to the sex difference in fear intensity: Women experience greater fear than men and 
greater fear is experienced as more distressing.  Nonetheless, after controlling for women’s greater 
fear, there remained a significant sex difference in the rated enjoyment of the fear experience.    
In summary, we found sex differences in fear using questionnaire items that were selected 
to show no gender bias, to generate a meaningful aggregate score, to assess fear rather than anxiety 
and to focus on situated fears rather than reactions to phobic stimuli. Despite near perfect 
agreement between the sexes about the relative ranking of the situations in terms of fear elicitation, 
the sex difference in reported fear was large.      
 Adolphs (2013) has called for closer integration between the ecology of fear (its triggers and 
phenomenology as they are experienced ‘in the wild’) and studies of the neural circuitry that 
underlie its wide-ranging effects. We hope the SFQ can help to bridge this gap. Experimentally, the 
questionnaire can be of use in establishing sex (and individual) differences in fearfulness that may 
mediate differential neural, physiological and behavioural reactivity to manipulations.  Beyond the 
laboratory, sex invariant measurement allows hypotheses about the evolutionary, developmental 
and cultural origins of sex differences in fear to be pursued more rigorously.   We hope that it will 
encourage researchers in the development of models of fear in relation to the wide range of sex-
linked phenomena in which it has been implicated including psychopathy, PTSD, inhibitory control, 
decision-making, attentional bias, risky impulsivity, sensation seeking, disgust, and aggression.  
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Table 1 
 
Means (and standard deviations) by sex, Rasch item fit statistics and Mokken indices of differential item functioning  
 
  
Fear score 
 
Rasch item indices Mokken item indices 
Item Men Women Infit Outfit 
(mean 
square) 
Partial r Tristan t 
Differential 
Item Function 
 
Item H values 
(36 items) 
Item H values  
(27 items) 
1. You are walking down a poorly lit 
alleyway at night. You can hear 
footsteps behind you but you can’t see 
anybody there 
 
2.73 
(0.96) 
3.80 
(0.92) 
0.80   
0.80 
0.64 -0.37a 0.29 0.31 
2. You are on a transatlantic flight and 
suddenly you feel the plane bumping 
about as it loses and gains altitude 
 
1.98  
(1.13) 
2.78 
(1.24) 
1.06   
1.07 
0.5 -0.93 a 0.20  
3. You are just about to do a bungee 
jump off the side of a bridge; the initial 
drop is over 200m  
 
3.20 
(1.32) 
3.72 
(1.16) 
1.08 
1.07 
0.48 0.45 a 0.30 0.31 
4. You are on the world’s largest roller 
coaster, it is juddering as it ascents to 
the first peak 
 
2.50a 
(1.22) 
2.74 
(1.19) 
1.12 
1.12 
0.44 2.15   
5. When you are in the middle of a 
presentation in front of some 
influential people. Your powerpoint 
stops working so you have to speak ad 
lib 
2.22 
(1.03) 
2.60 
(1.05) 
1.03   
1.05 
0.47 1.85 a 0.18  
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6. You are driving along the motor way 
at 70mph. Somebody cuts in front of 
you very suddenly and you have to 
break hard 
 
2.51 
(0.90) 
3.05 
(1.02) 
0.96   
0.96 
0.51 -2.30   
7. You are alone in your house during 
the night when you hear what sounds 
like someone breaking in  
 
3.28 
(0.98) 
4.11 
(0.83) 
0.87   
0.87 
0.57 -1.21 a 0.34 0.36 
8. You are scuba diving and suddenly 
your oxygen tank starts to malfunction 
 
3.78 
(1.07) 
4.22 
(0.91) 
1.01   
0.97 
0.47 -1.60 a 0.27  
9. You are in a large crowd at a music 
concert and have been separated from 
your friends. They are nowhere to be 
seen 
 
1.21 
(0.46) 
2.06 
(0.94) 
0.90   
0.82 
0.55 -1.79 a 0.27  
10. You have overslept and missed an 
important meeting with your boss 
 
3.03a 
(0.95) 
3.09 
(0.95) 
1.17   
1.18 
0.31 3.01   
11. You are on the top floor of a 
building when a fire alarm goes off. 
You reach the staircase and see the fire 
blocking the stairs down to the ground 
floor 
 
3.90 
(0.97) 
4.50 
(0.77) 
0.94   
0.93 
0.49 -0.49 a 0.35 0.39 
12. You are swimming in the sea with a 
few friends. You can feel yourself being 
rapidly pulled away from the shore by 
a rip tide 
 
3.23 
(1.05) 
3.71 
(0.93) 
1.01   
1.03 
0.45 -1.09 a 0.29 0.31 
13. You lose your train ticket and 2.23 2.73 0.96   0.5 0.12 a 0.31 0.33 
34 
 
realise that the guard will be checking 
soon. You have no more cash to pay a 
fine or pay for a new one 
 
(0.87) (1.04) 0.96 
14. You are drunk at a party out of 
town and your friends have gone home 
without you 
 
1.71 
(0.82) 
2.42 
(1.06) 
0.95   
0.92 
0.53 -0.54 a 0.36 0.39 
15. On holiday, you leave a party late 
and realise you do not know how to get 
back to your holiday flat 
 
 
 
2.03 
(0.91) 
3.02 
(0.95) 
0.79   
0.79 
0.65 -3.77   
16. You can feel a lump beneath your 
breast / prostate 
 
3.18 
(0.95) 
3.47 
(1.06) 
1.15   
1.14 
0.36 -0.85 a 0.23  
17. You realise you have left the 
iron/gas on when you left for work this 
morning 
 
2.94 
(0.83) 
3.27 
(0.95) 
1.08   
1.08 
0.37 -0.28 a 0.33 0.35 
18. Sitting on top of the bus, a group of 
teenagers is in front of you are making 
threatening comments 
 
2.30 
(0.93) 
2.64 
(1.01) 
1.02   
1.00 
0.46 1.04 a 0.32 0.35 
19. You are the only person standing on 
the train platform late at night 
 
1.37 
(0.61) 
2.56 
(1.02) 
0.89   
0.87 
0.59 -3.85   
20. You are looking after a child with 
asthma – she complains she feels 
breathless 
 
2.50 
(0.85) 
2.76 
(0.96) 
1.00   
1.01 
0.45 4.30   
21. You have borrowed your friend’s 2.19 2.58 1.06   0.4 3.24   
35 
 
laptop without asking. She now claims it 
is not working properly 
 
(0.87) (0.92) 1.06 
22. You check the petrol gauge – your 
car is running at empty and there is no 
garage for miles 
 
2.16 
(0.92) 
2.53 
(0.88) 
0.93   
0.93 
 
0.51 1.44 a 0.34 0.36 
23. All the electrics fuse in your house, 
and you are alone and unsure of where 
the fuse box is 
 
1.52 
(0.87) 
2.44 
(1.12) 
1.00   
1.04 
0.51 -0.62 a 0.35 0.37 
24. You are involved in a car accident 
on a busy motorway. You have been 
taken to hospital and you cannot feel 
any sensation in your legs 
 
4.42a 
(0.67) 
4.57 
(0.63) 
1.14   
1.33 
0.19 1.22 a 0.34 0.36 
25. You have just been told a close 
relative has had to have emergency 
surgery after a traffic accident 
 
3.86 
(0.92) 
4.15 
(0.85) 
1.10   
1.16 
0.34 3.22   
26. Your flight has been cancelled due 
to bad weather conditions. You think 
you may be stranded abroad with little 
money 
1.83 
(0.84) 
2.33 
(0.89) 
0.90   
0.93 
0.53 1.72 a 0.35 0.38 
27. A member of your family is on 
holiday abroad, and you hear that 
there have been terrorist attacks in the 
city where they are staying. You cannot 
get hold of them 
 
3.40 
(0.90) 
4.10 
(0.87) 
0.94   
0.95 
0.51 1.44 a 0.32 0.34 
28. You hit an icy patch on a busy main 
road, and lose complete control of the 
car 
3.64 
(0.98) 
4.07 
(0.85) 
0.90   
0.90 
0.53 -0.63 a 0.38 0.42 
36 
 
 
29. You stall your car on a busy 
roundabout. You cannot seem to start 
it again 
 
2.04 
(0.98) 
2.60 
(1.05) 
0.89   
0.89 
0.57 1.57 a 0.33 0.36 
30. You are crossing a field with a large 
bull in it 
 
 
2.11 
(0.81) 
2.71 
(1.05) 
0.98   
0.99 
0.49 1.19 a 0.28  
31. Your neighbour has hurt herself 
very badly in the garden – she appears 
to be unconscious 
 
2.61 
(0.93) 
3.06 
(0.99) 
1.01   
1.00 
0.47 -1.47 a 0.29 0.30 
32. A member of your family should 
have been home many hours ago – you 
cannot contact them 
 
2.70 
(1.05) 
3.32 
(1.03) 
0.96   
0.97 
0.52 -1.92 a 0.29 0.32 
33. You are told your sexual partner is 
HIV positive 
 
4.47a 
(0.66) 
4.58 
0.69) 
1.17   
1.39 
0.2 0.22 a 0.22  
34. You have just bet a large amount of 
money in a casino 
 
2.71a 
(1.03) 
2.86 
(1.02) 
1.18   
1.18 
0.34 1.47 a 0.25  
35. You are called to one side as you go 
through ‘Customs’ 
 
1.54 
(0.74) 
1.92 
(0.89) 
0.96   
0.97 
0.46 -0.72 a 0.31 0.33 
36. You are asked to provide a 
breathalyser test – you think you 
should be below the limit, but you 
have had a bit to drink 
 
2.70 
(0.87) 
3.01 
(0.93) 
1.05   
1.05 
0.4 0.53 a 0.35 0.38 
37. You are abroad and the taxi driver 
is driving over 70mph. There are no 
2.33 
(0.92) 
2.96 
(0.89) 
0.90   
0.89 
0.54 1.50 a 0.33 0.36 
37 
 
safety belts in the vehicle 
 
38. You go for a walk on the cliffs with 
friends – there is no barrier and the 
path is very narrow with a steep drop to 
the sea 
2.27a 
(1.15) 
2.47 
(1.08) 
1.04   
1.09 
0.46 2.66   
39. You are caught outside in a heavy 
thunder storm with lightening very 
close by 
 
1.53 
(0.69) 
2.19 
(0.99) 
0.94   
0.92 
0.52 -0.83 a 0.34 0.36 
40. You are told you risk permanent 
blindness as your retina is detaching, 
you must get to hospital quickly 
 
4.18a 
(0.82) 
4.33 
(0.85) 
1.10   
1.12 
0.34 0.70 a 0.33 0.35 
41. Your lift gets stuck between floors – 
you are alone 
 
2.14 
(1.01) 
3.21 
(1.19) 
0.99   
0.99 
0.55 -3.42   
42. The police are moving people out 
of the airport area you are in because 
of a suspect package 
 
1.89 
(0.81) 
2.57 
(1.06) 
0.91   
0.90 
0.55 -1.31 a 0.34 0.37 
43. You have received several 
anonymous calls to your mobile, and 
this time the person is making 
threatening comments 
 
2.41 
(0.97) 
3.26 
(0.98) 
0.90   
0.89 
0.57 -2.58   
44. Your computer is stolen and you 
have not backed up your work 
 
3.18 
(1.17) 
3.52 
(1.10) 
1.12   
1.10 
0.43 -0.22 a 0.26  
45. You have just been asked at short 
notice to give a ‘vote of thanks’ speech 
at a friend’s wedding 
 
2.20a 
(1.14) 
2.33 
(1.08) 
1.28   
1.35 
0.3 2.80   
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46. You are white water-rafting in 
Australia, and the instructor is finding 
it difficult to keep control of the raft 
2.52 
(0.81) 
3.17 
(0.91) 
0.84   
0.84 
0.59 1.07 a 0.39 0.42 
 
47. You are on your gap year travels 
and have to cross a make-shift jungle 
bridge high above a chasm 
 
 
2.91 
(1.07) 
 
3.23 
(1.17) 
 
1.02   
1.03 
 
0.5 
 
1.92 a 
 
0.36 
 
0.39 
48. You lie down on your bed and see a 
large house spider on your pillow 
 
1.81 
(1.15) 
3.07 
(1.36) 
1.23   
1.36 
0.45 -2.86   
49. Whilst you are swimming off the 
coast of South Africa; the shark warning 
is sounded 
 
3.51 
(0.91) 
3.85 
(1.01) 
1.01   
1.01 
0.46 -2.95   
50. You are in the middle of taking an 
important exam. You have just read 
the questions and realise that you have 
not revised the relevant topics 
 
3.47 
(1.12) 
3.93 
(0.96) 
1.02   
1.03 
0.47 -1.20 a 0.32 0.33 
 
Final 27-item scale 
2.70 
(0.42) 
3.23  
(0.44) 
 
   Scale H=.31 Scale H=.36 
 
Items in bold were those retained on the 36-itemscale.  
Items bold and underlined were retained on the 27-item scale  
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Table 2 
 
Convergent and divergent validity of SFQ with personality and temperament measures 
 
 
 
 
 FSS  PAQ 
Masculinity 
PAQ  
Femininity 
ATQ 
Approach 
ATQ  
avoidance 
ZKPQ 
Impulsivity 
ZKPQ 
Sensation 
Seeking 
ZKPQ 
Neuroticism-
Anxiety 
MPQ 
Stress 
Reaction 
MPQ 
Harm 
Avoidance 
SFQ .69*** 
Sample 3 
(N=245) 
 
 
-.20** 
Sample 3 
(N=245) 
.20** 
Sample 3 
(N=245) 
.09 
Sample 2 
(N=309) 
.33*** 
Sample 2 
(N=309) 
-.09 
Sample 2 
(N=305) 
-.15** 
Sample 2 
(N=306) 
.31*** 
Sample 2 
(N=306) 
 
.29*** 
Sample 3 
(N=245) 
 
.39*** 
Sample 3 
(N=245) 
.32*** 
Sample 2 
(N=297) 
 
 
 ** p<.01 
*** p<.001 
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Table 3 
 
Sex differences in mean Situated Fear Questionnaire scores in three samples 
 
 
Sample Male Female t d 
1 (UK) 2.70 (0.42) 3.23 (0.45) 9.75 (df=299) -1.22 
2 (Romanian) 2.38 (0.59) 3.08 (0.53) 9.83 (df=308) -1.23 
3 (UK) 2.66 (0.57) 3.22 (0.50) 8.16 (df=243) -1.04 
 
 
 
